ILLEGAL LOGGING AS A DISINCENTIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A SUSTAINABLE FOREST SECTOR IN THE AMAZON
Brazil is facing the challenge of establishing a sustainable timber sector in the Amazon.
The forest concessions system in public forests is one of the strategies to stimulate a formal and legalized timber production that generates revenues for the government that can be used to fund protected areas.
However, illegal logging outside the concession system creates disadvantage for legal loggers by competing for market share and thus may reduce the incentives for legal loggers to participate in the bidding process for access to concessions.
Through our simulation study, we show that lack of enforcement against illegal logging may induce a decrease in concessions profitability in the long-term by competition. A clear leakage effect can be simulated using simple cost-benefit and land access rules.
Here we present the underlying dataset used for these simulations, including maps and their metadata, and tables. The model script is also provided. Parameter values as well as the list of assumptions for each scenario can be found in our publication.
The model was implemented using Dinamica EGO software version 3.0.5 (Dinamica EGO Copyright© 1998-2015 Centro de Sensoriamento Remoto / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais – Brazil). Available at www.csr.ufmg.br/dinamica. Computer requirements for running the model consist of multiprocessor computer running Windows Seven OS or higher with at least 64 Gigabytes of RAM. Download input files under the same root folder.
Further information or guidance, please contact dinamica@csr.ufmg.br or leticialima@ymail.com.
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